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WHO SHOULD DECIDE THE APPROPRIATE
RESPONSE TO THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT WHO
PROPOSES OR COMMITS PERJURY: A
COMPARISON OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
PATRICIA H.
I.

MARSCHALL*

INTRODUCTION

Legal scholars have long debated how an attorney should respond to
his criminal defendant client who threatens or commits perjury. 1 One
cannot comfortably resolve the tension between the desire to protect client confidences and the need to promote ascertainment of the truth. It
may be useful to ask who can best decide the appropriate response to the
perjurious client: the client himself, the individual lawyer or the organized bar through a rule that mandates a particular response? The North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct 2 allocate most of the decisionmaking to the individual lawyer, while the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3 mandate a specific response to
actual perjury. This comment compares the allocation of decisionmaking power in the two sets of rules and suggests that North Carolina
should amend its rules to require disclosure of client perjury.
* Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University School of Law.
1. EFg., Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer. The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966), arguing that a defense lawyer who is unsuccessful
in preventing his client's perjury and in his efforts to withdraw should not reveal his client's perjury
and should continue to conduct the trial as if the perjury has not occurred; Wolfram, ClientPerjury,
50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809, 848-53 (1977), suggesting that the only workable approach is to require the
attorney to inform the court that the client's testimony has no factual basis.
2. The Council of the North Carolina State Bar adopted these rules in July 1985, and the
North Carolina Supreme Court approved them in October 1985.
3. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules in August 1983. The format,
which substitutes Comments for the Ethical Considerations contained in the earlier Model Code,
was used by the drafters of the 1985 North Carolina Rules who did not, however, always chose to
adopt the text of the Model Rules and Comments.
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II.

ALLOCATION OF DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY: A COMPARISON
OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND
THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT.

A.

When the Client Threatens Perjury

This section discusses the extent of the lawyer's decisionmaking power
when a client has revealed an intent to testify falsely but has not yet done
so. The lawyer's duties and the extent of his discretion are examined,
first, in the pre-trial period and then at trial.
1. Allocation of Decisionmaking Power Before Trial
The North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct in Rule 7.2(b)(1)
place two initial mandatory requirements on the lawyer when his client
threatens to commit perjury. The lawyer shall promptly call on his client
to rectify the situation (i.e. state that he will not commit perjury), and if
the client refuses to do so the lawyer must request permission from the
court to withdraw. Although the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct contain nothing in black letter about the
lawyer's duty at this stage, comment 5 to Model Rule 3.3 states that a
lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the false evidence should
not be offered. Comment 7 to Model Rule 3.3 states that if persuasion
fails, the lawyer ordinarily can withdraw during the pre-trial period, and
the lawyer apparently must seek to withdraw under Rule 1.16 in order to
avoid violating the rules against the use of false evidence.
May the attorney reveal to the court the client's intention to commit
perjury? At the pre-trial stage North Carolina Rule 7.2(b)(1) lets the
lawyer decide by providing that his request for permission to withdraw is
made "without necessarily revealing his reason for wishing to withdraw." North Carolina Rule 4(C)(4) permits, but does not require, a
lawyer to reveal confidential information concerning the client's intention to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime. The leading North Carolina case on client perjury, State v. Robinson, 4 described as "commendable" defense counsel's action in revealing
to the court the defendant's proposed perjury.5 Robinson is still controlling authority because North Carolina Rule 4(C)(4) retains the language
that was in effect at the time Robinson was decided.
The Model Rules also allow, but do not require, the lawyer to reveal
his client's threat to commit perjury, although a cursory reading of
Model Rule 1.6 would seem to prohibit revelation. Model Rule 1.6 has
narrowed the scope of the exceptions to the confidentiality requirement
4. 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
5. Id. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
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by allowing the lawyer to reveal confidential information about the client's threatened criminal activity only if the lawyer believes it is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. Perjury would not
be within this category, and a reading of this rule alone indicates the
attorney must not disclose the client's threat to commit perjury. In Nix
v. Whiteside,6 however, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
Model Rules to allow disclosure of intended perjury. The Court focused
on Rule 3.3(b) which states that the duties to avoid assisting a criminal
or fraudulent act by the client and to avoid offering evidence the lawyer
knows to be false, apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
Brent Appel, the Iowa Deputy Attorney General who participated in
Nix, believes that the Court interpreted the Model Rules as requiring
disclosure of a client's perjury plan to the trial court.7 Appel's reading of
Nix is understandable because the Court combined language about intended client perjury with language about accomplished perjury in such a
way that it is very difficult to tell what the Court meant. The Court
stated:
Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct also adopt the specific exception from the attorney-client privilege for disclosure of perjury that his client intends to
commit or has committed. DR 4-101(C)(3) (intention of client to commit a crime); Rule 3.3 (lawyer has duty to disclose falsity of evidence
even if disclosure compromises client confidences). Indeed, both the
Model Code and the Model Rules do not merely authorize disclosure by
counsel of client perjury; they requiresuch disclosure. See Rule 3.3(a)(4);
DR 7-102 (3)(1) .. .
Contrary to what Appel believes, this language should be read as allowing, not requiring, disclosure of proposed client perjury. The Court is
indicating first that the attorney-elient privilege does not prevent a lawyer from disclosing either threatened perjury or accomplished perjury,
and second that both the Model Rules and the Model Code of Professional Conduct require such disclosure of perjury once it occurs. The
permissiveness of DR 4-101 (C)(3), which was cited by the Court,
strengthens this interpretation. The rule states that a lawyer may reveal
the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent it. Furthermore, Model Rule 3.3, which also was cited by
the Court, has comments which make a fairly clear distinction between a
lawyer's duties during the pre-trial period and his duties once perjury
6. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). In Nix the Court held that criminal defense counsel's threat to disclose was within the reasonable range of conduct required for effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
7. APPEL, Nix v. Whitesid" The Role of Apples, Oranges and the GreatHoudini in Constitutional Adjudication, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 20 (1987).
8. Nix, 475 U.S. at 168.
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actually occurs at trial. Comments 5 and 7 make clear that during the
pre-trial period the lawyer should seek to dissuade the client from offering false evidence; and if such remonstrances fail, the lawyer ordinarily
can withdraw. After setting forth these appropriate prophylactic measures to prevent client perjury, comment 11 to Model Rule 3.3 then emphasizes remedial measures which include mandatory revelation of the
perjury if confidential remonstrances with the client and attempted withdrawal have failed.
Finally, in Nix the Court did not criticize defense counsel Robinson
for allowing his client to take the stand without first disclosing to the
trial court Whiteside's intent to commit perjury. For these reasons, the
troublesome language in Nix should be interpreted as allowing, not requiring, disclosure of threatened client perjury.
After giving the criminal defense lawyer the discretion to either conceal or reveal his client's plan to testify falsely, neither the Model Rules
nor the North Carolina Rules specify how the lawyer may properly cajole his client to tell the truth. Nix v. Whiteside partially filled that gap
by making it clear that under the Model Rules the lawyer may, without
violating his client's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, encourage truthful testimony by threatening to attempt withdrawal and to reveal any perjury that the client does commit.9 As will be
discussed in section II(B), the Model Rules require disclosure of actual
perjury, while the North Carolina Rules leave revelation in the discretion
of counsel. Therefore, a North Carolina lawyer properly could threaten
to reveal the client's accomplished perjury only if the lawyer intended to
exercise his discretion by carrying through with the threat. Otherwise he
would be in violation of North Carolina Rule 1.2(C) which prohibits a
lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation. This prohibition against misrepresentation precludes a North Carolina lawyer from telling his client that the lawyer is required to reveal
client perjury.
In summary, both North Carolina Rule 7.2(b)(1) and Model Rule
3.3(b), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Nix, allow, but do not
require, a lawyer to disclose his client's planned perjury to the trial court.
The propriety of this delegation of power to counsel will be discussed
later.
2.

Allocation of Decisionmaking Power at the Trial Stage: Who
Decides Whether the Client Takes the Stand and the
Scope of Direct Examination

Suppose the criminal defense lawyer has engaged in the prophylactic
9. Id. at 171.
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procedures of remonstrating with the client and seeking to withdraw, but
without revealing the threatened perjury to the court, and the court then
refuses to allow withdrawal. Assume further that the lawyer believes the
client will perjure himself if put on the stand. Should the client or the
lawyer make the decision whether the client will testify?
On matters that relate to objectives of the representation, the client
traditionally has been granted the decisionmaking authority. According
to Model Rule 1.2(a), in a criminal case the client decides the plea to be
entered, whether to waive a jury trial and whether to testify. The same
rule is set forth in North Carolina Rule 7(C)(1). Some doubt was cast on
the defendant's constitutional right to testify in his own defense by the
majority opinion in Nix v. Whiteside which states:
Whatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify, it is elementary
that such a right does not extend to testifying falsely. In Harrisv. New
York, we assumed the right of an accused to testify 'in his own defense,
or to refuse to do so' and went on to hold: '[T]hat privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury'... .
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, expressed puzzlement
about the court's implicit suggestion that the constitutional right to testify in one's own defense remains an open question." He cited Supreme
Court cases referring to the existence of such a right, including Jones v.
Barnes12 in which the court stated that the defendant has the "'ultimate
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case,
[such as]... whether to... testify in his or her own behalf ....
11
a
In the recent case of Rock v. Arkansas," which centered on the issue of
whether a criminal defendant's right to testify may be restricted by a
state rule that excludes defendant's post-hypnosis testimony, the
Supreme Court stated that "it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a
criminal case has the right to take the stand and testify in his or her own
behalf."1 5 Acknowledging that this right is subject to some limitation,
the Court said restrictions "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to
the purpose they are designed to serve." 1 6 Arkansas' per se rule excluding all post-hypnosis testimony was held to infringe impermissibly on
defendant's right to testify in her own behalf.
What appropriate and non-arbitrary restrictions on a criminal defendant's right to testify may the criminal defense lawyer impose on the client
who has indicated he will testify falsely? The narrative approach, which
10. Id. at 173.

11. Id. at 186 n. 5.
12. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
13. Id. at 751.
14. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S.Ct. 2704 (1987).

15. Id.at 2708.
16. Id. at 2711.
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would allow counsel to stand mute while the defendant presents his false
testimony unaided by direct examination, is rejected in comment 9 to
Rule 3.3. It also was rejected by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Robinson " as a violation of due process under both the federal
and state constitutions, where the trial court allowed defense counsel to
begin questioning the defendant's only witness and then to step aside
leaving the defendant himself to take over the direct examination. The
North Carolina Supreme Court found that this trial tactic inevitably
prejudiced the defendant's case."8 Presumably the court would have
reached the same result had the defendant himself taken the stand and
been forced to use the narrative approach to present his own testimony.
In Nix the Court pointed out in footnote 6 that although the eighth
and ninth Circuits have expressed approval of the narrative approach,
most courts have rejected it.19 The ABA has left the narrative approach
as "proposed" Standard 4-7.7 of the Standards for Criminal Justice without ever actually adopting it.2' Apparently this method of coping with
the perjurious client is an idea whose time came briefly and is now
quickly passing.2 1
Another method of protecting the client's right to give truthful testimony without forcing the lawyer to breach his obligation to avoid offering false evidence has been set forth in ABA Formal Opinion 87-353.22
If the perjurious client has steadfastly maintained that he will testify
falsely, and if the false testimony is the only testimony the client would
give, that opinion allows the lawyer to refuse his client's request to take
the stand. Assuming the client also has truthful testimony to offer in his
defense, the opinion advises the lawyer to examine the client only on
matters that will not produce false testimony. If the lawyer reasonably
believes that his pre-trial remonstrances have convinced his client to testify truthfully, he may examine the client in the usual manner. This procedure seems reasonably tailored both to protect the defendant's right to
take the stand to give truthful testimony and to derail his planned

perjury.
In order to carry out the approach suggested in Formal Opinion 87353, the lawyer needs guidelines as to how certain he should be that the
client intends to commit perjury.2 3 North Carolina Rule 7.2(B)(1) requires that the lawyer receive information "clearly establishing" that his
17. 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
18. Id. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
19. Nix, 475 U.S. at 170.
20. Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice § 4-7.7 (1979).
21. However, some courts continue to use the narrative approach. See, Commonwealth v. Mascitti, 368 Pa. Super. 454, 534 A.2d 524 (1987).
22. Lawyers' Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 901:101 (1987).
23. Some lawyers will follow Professor Monroe Freedman's advice to avoid "knowing" that a
client plans to give false testimony. FREEDMAN, The Aftermath ofNix v. Whiteside: Slamming the
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client intends to testify falsely before he is allowed to reveal the proposed
perjury to the court. If the lawyer decides against pre-trial revelation,
presumably the same standard would be applicable for the lawyer's decision either to refuse to call his client to the stand or to question his client
about a particular matter. The Model Rules contain two standards regarding the lawyer's obligation not to introduce false evidence. The first
contained in Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) mandatorily prohibits offering evidence the lawyer "knows" to be false, and the second, contained in
Model Rule 3.3(C) is discretionary, stating that the lawyer "may" refuse
to offer evidence that the lawyer "reasonably believes" is false. Professor
Carol Rieger argues that the first standard is almost impossible to meet,
and that the second standard is insufficient to protect criminal defendants. 4 She proposes a third single standard "one which requires that the
attorney be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the client's testimony will be perjurious."2 5 Rieger's suggestion of adopting a single standard is appealing. Requiring a lawyer to decide whether a client will be
called to testify, and if he is called, what questions will be asked, and then
demanding that counsel decide what he "may" or "must" do by splitting
a very fine hair between "knowing" and having a "reasonable belief"
that his client intends to commit perjury is an impossible burden. Rieger's proposed standard would be less likely than the current North Carolina and Model Rules Standards to infringe on the criminal defendants's
constitutional right to testify in his own behalf.
3.

Summary

Where client perjury looms as a threat before trial, the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct make the same allocations of decisionmaking power. Both retain some power in the state by mandating
that the criminal defense lawyer first shall seek to dissuade his client
from committing perjury, and if the dissuasion fails, that the lawyer then
shall seek to withdraw. However, both sets of rules then allow the lawyer to decide whether to reveal the threatened perjury to the court.
The client has a constitutional right to take the stand and testify truthfully as is reflected in both the Model Rules and the North Carolina
Rules. However, if the lawyer "knows" (under the Model Rules) or has
received "information clearly establishing" (under the North Carolina
Rules) that his client intends to testify falsely, the lawyer must not offer
Lid on Pandora'sBox, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 25 (1987). This subterfuge violates the spirit of the Model
Rules as interpreted by Nix, even if the letter is obeyed.
24. RIEGER, Client Perury: A ProposedResolution of the Constitutionaland EthicalIssues, 70
MiNN.L. REv. 121, 149 (1985).
25. Id.
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that testimony. Neither the Model Rules nor the North Carolina Rules
offer guidance enabling the lawyer to protect his client's right to testify
while attempting to avoid the introduction of false evidence. ABA Formal Opinion 87-353 would allow the lawyer to refuse to call the client if
the client has no truthful testimony to give, and assuming the client has
both truthful and false testimony to give, would allow the attorney to
refuse to ask questions which would elicit the falsehood. Formal Opinion 87-353 indicates that the lawyer ordinarily can reasonably believe
that his persuasions will be successful, and he therefore "may permit the
client to testify and may examine the client in the normal manner."26
B.

When PerYury Occurs
Assume that the lawyer believed his client would testify truthfully, but
the client does commit perjury. Under both the comments to Model
Rule 3.3 and under North Carolina Rule 7.2(B)1, the lawyer has the
duty to encourage rectification by the client, and if that fails, to seek to
withdraw. If these measures fail, may or must the lawyer reveal the client's perjury to the court? At this juncture, the Model Rules and the
North Carolina Rules diverge.
Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) states that "if a lawyer has offered material evidence and come to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures." Comment 11 states that where neither remonstrating with the client nor withdrawal has remedied the situation, the advocate should make disclosure to the court. The drafters' intent that the
disclosure requirement be mandatory, even in criminal cases, is made
clear in comment 12 which states that "[t]he general rule - that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury with respect to a material
fact, even that of a client - applies to defense counsel in criminal cases
Comment 12 to Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) then acknowledges that the lawyer's ethical duty may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due
process and right to counsel. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Nix v.
Whiteside, however, indicates that a criminal defense counsel's disclosure
of his client's perjury will not invade the client's constitutional rights.
The Court focused on the comments to Model Rule 3.3 in concluding
that the Model Rules require disclosure by counsel of client perjury.27 In
Nix, the court was not faced with the issue of the constitutionality of the
disclosure requirement because Whiteside testified truthfully. However,
the court held that counsel's pre-trial threat of disclosing any actual perjury was within the range of reasonable professional responses to
threatened perjury and therefore not a denial of his client's right to effec26. Lawyers' Man. of Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 901:106 (1987).
27. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 168.
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tive assistance of counsel. Such a holding necessarily implies that disclosure of actual perjury is not a violation of a criminal defendant's
constitutional rights.
North Carolina Rule 7.2(D)(1) refused to follow the Model Rules and
kept the decisionmaking power in the hands of the individual lawyer
even when the client actually commits perjury. The attorney's standard
of conduct is precisely the same whether the client has threatened, or
actually has committed, perjury. North Carolina Rule 7.2(B)(1) states:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His client intends to or has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and, if the client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall
discontinue his representation of the client in that matter; and if the representation involves litigation, the lawyer shall (if applicable rules require) request the tribunal to permit him to withdraw,
but without
28
necessarily revealing his reasonfor wishing to withdraw.
In summary, once perjury occurs, the Model Rules grant no decisionmaking power to the individual lawyer. He must (1) encourage client
rectification and if that fails (2) seek to withdraw and if withdrawal is
denied or fails to remedy the situation (3) reveal the perjury if the client
has refused to do so himself. In contrast, although the North Carolina
Rules also mandate encouraging client rectification and attempted withdrawal, the crucial disclosure - non disclosure decision is given to the
individual lawyer.

III. WHO Is THE BEST DECISIONMAKER?
In allocating decisiomnaking power, it is important to determine what
person or group has the best access to the facts on which the decision will
be based. Consideration also should be given to the effect that the decision will have on individuals, on groups and on society as a whole. Decisions which seriously impact on the judicial system and/or the public
presumably should be made by some politically accountable person or
group.
When a client threatens perjury before trial, the Model Rules and the
North Carolina Rules correctly regard the organized bar as the decisionmaker for the bottom line prophylactic rules. The individual lawyer
is told he must attempt to persuade his client to testify truthfully, and he
must seek to withdraw if the client refuses. Although some lawyers find
it easy to encourage clients toward truthfulness, many who are particularly zealous to protect their clients' interest, and sometimes equally zealous to protect their own track record, incorrectly regard admonishments
against perjury and attempted withdrawals as a betrayal on the part of
28. Emphasis added.
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the attorney. Such prophylactic actions by the attorney do little or no
harm to the individual client and, when successful, greatly enhance the
integrity of the judicial process.
Disclosure to the court of the client's threatened perjury is a more
radical sanction against the client than remonstrances and attempted
withdrawal. Presumably most lawyers will refrain from revealing anticipated perjury unless the client has made it clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that he will testify falsely. Although no one can predict with complete accuracy whether the client will be truthful on the witness stand,
the individual lawyer is the only person in a position to attempt such a
prediction. Therefore, the Model Rules and the North Carolina Rules
have correctly allocated to the individual lawyer the decision whether to
reveal his client's threatened perjury. If the lawyer mistakenly predicts
that his client will testify truthfully, the ramifications to the judicial process will not be serious because the lawyer can reveal the perjury to the
court once it actually occurs.
Mandating disclosure of threatened client perjury would be unfair to
the client who needs to use his lawyer as an ethical sounding board, and
the unfairness might in some circumstances rise to the level of violating a
defendant's Sixth Amendment and/or Due Process rights. As Justice
Blackmum pointed out in his concurring opinion in Nix:
Whether an attorney's response to what he sees as a client's plan to
commit perjury violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights may depend on many factors: how certain the attorney is that the proposed
testimony is false, the stage of the proceedings at which the attorney discovers the plan, or the ways in which the attorney may be able to dissuade his client, to name just three. The complex interaction of factors,
which is likely to vary from case to case, makes inappropriate a blanket
rule that defense attorneys must reveal, or threaten to reveal, a client's
anticipated perjury to the court. Except in the rarest of cases, attorneys
who adopt "the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts," United
States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (CA3 1977), pose a
danger of depriving their clients of the zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment. 29
Assuming that pre-trial disclosure of a client's plan to commit perjury
will remain permissive, we also can assume that lawyers in most circumstances will give their clients the benefit of any doubt and not reveal anticipated perjury. This does not mean that a lawyer should be the
decisionmaker regarding whether the defendant will testify and the scope
of direct examination. Although comment 8 to Model Rule 3.3 mentions
the need for the lawyer to exercise control over the proof, neither the
Model Rules nor the North Carolina Rules suggest a method of control.
29. Nix, 475 U.S. at 157, 188-189 (1986).
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To protect the lawyer from a charge of subornation of perjury, and to
avoid, if possible, the introduction of false testimony by the criminal defendant, the North Carolina Rules should be amended to incorporate the
guidelines found in ABA Formal Opinion 87-353 discussed in Section
II(A)(2). If these matters are left within the discretion of the lawyer,
many will exercise that discretion by questioning the client in the usual
manner, even when such tactics are almost certain to result in false
testimony. °
Allocation of decisionmaking power to the individual lawyer with respect to threatened perjury by the criminal defendant client has been
shown to be proper. Once the defendant has committed perjury, however, the situation changes. The act that was merely a threat has indeed
occurred. Before jumping to a conclusion about who is now the best
decisionmaker, it should be noted that the relationship between the rules
governing threatened perjury and accomplished perjury should fit together logically. If the individual lawyer is deemed to be the best decisionmaker with regard to revealing threatened perjury, it would be
illogical to forbid him to disclose the perjury once it has occurred. The
lawyer must either retain the decision-making power, as he currently
does under North Carolina Rules, or the organized bar must require him
to reveal his client's perjury, if that is the only effective remedial measure
available, which is the approach taken by the ABA Model Rules.
Mandatory disclosure is the better choice for several reasons.
Mandatory disclosure is fairer to criminal defendants because it tends
to ensure equality of treatment. Without mandatory disclosure not all
lawyers will choose to disclose perjury, thus creating an unequal burden
on clients whose attorneys do disclose. Professor Monroe Freedman in
1975 told of a survey of lawyers in the District of Columbia revealing
that ninety percent would question a perjurious witness in the normal
manner despite the fact that the Code of Professional Responsibility appeared to be unambiguous in prohibiting the knowing use of perjured
testimony.3 1 This indicates that we need not only a rule mandating disclosure of client perjury, but also vigorous enforcement of the rule
against noncomplying lawyers.
Another benefit to criminal defendants from a rule requiring disclosure
of client perjury, is that some who initially plan to testify falsely will be
"Nixed" into testifying truthfully, thus avoiding a possible conviction for
30. Professors Hazard and Hodes believe that the enactment of Model Rule 3.3(a)(4), which
requires whistle blowing on a client only when a court is defrauded, reflects a strengthening consensus that "the line must be drawn at protecting the decision-making process itself .... G. HAZARD
AND W. HODES, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct

(Supp. 1987).
31. FREEDMAN, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, 1 LrrIG. 26, 29-30 (No. 1, Winter 1975).
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perjury. This also helps the lawyer by removing the risk of a subornation
of perjury charge.
The final and most important reason for removing the lawyer as decisionmaker once perjury occurs is that the integrity of the judicial systems
is a sufficiently serious matter that decisionmaking should be allocated to
politically accountable entities. The North Carolina General Assembly
has delegated the power to draft rules of professional conduct governing
lawyers to the Council of the North Carolina State Bar,3" a body which is
accountable to all lawyers and to the general public as well.33 The Council is also accountable to the North Carolina Supreme Court which must
approve the rules before they become effective. 3
In contrast, the individual lawyer making the decision to reveal or conceal his client's perjury is not subject to political accountability. His decision perhaps will not even be subject to visibility because with luck the
decision to not reveal will be known only to him and his client. Even if
the client is subsequently charged with perjury, since the current North
Carolina rule allows the lawyer to conceal client perjury, the lawyer still
can escape accountability.
A lawyer deciding whether to reveal his client's perjury may be more
swayed by his concern for a particular client, or even concern for the
lawyer's win-loss record, than he is by larger concerns about the goals of
the legal system. Even if he does consider these goals, the attorney will
be affected by his individual views about which is more important: the
goal of truth seeking or the goal of protecting client confidences. Most
attorneys have a strong visceral bias toward one of these two goals. Thus
the individual lawyer, with no political accountability for his decision, is
susceptible to both improper motives and unavoidable bias in his decisionmaking. The North Carolina State Bar Council has made an inappropriate delegation of its powers to the individual lawyer.
If the organized bar believes that the goal of protecting client confidences outweighs the search for truth, the logical step is to remove all
decisionmaking power from the individual lawyer and promulgate rules
which prohibit revealing either a client's intent to commit perjury or his
actual perjury. If, however, the State Bar concludes that the integrity of
the judicial process takes precedence over the'need to protect client confidences, it should follow the lead of the Model Rules and mandate disclosure of accomplished client perjury.
It should be noted that in Nix35 the Supreme Court did not require.the
32. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-23 (1985).
33. In addition to the 50 attorney councilors, three public members not licensed to practice law
are appointed by the governor to the Council of the North Carolina State Bar. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8417 (Supp. 1987).
34. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-21 (1985).
35. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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states to adopt any particular rule, but merely clarified the constitutionality of the provision in Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) requiring revelation of client
perjury. However, if the Council of the North Carolina State Bar continues to delegate to individual lawyers the Bar's responsibility for choosing
between two conflicting goals, it will be issuing a clear invitation to the
United States Supreme Court to intervene. That body has not been reluctant to employ constitutional analysis to allocate decisionmaking
power among those persons, private groups or legislative bodies who
might exercise it. 36 In PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan, 37 the Court invali-

dated a statutory delegation of power to the President to prevent transportation of oil production in excess of state permission. Noting that
Congress' delegation "has declared no policy, has established no standard"38 for the President to follow, the Court concluded:
To hold that he is free to select as he chooses from the many and various
objects generally described in the [statute], and then to act without making any finding with respect to any object he does select, and the circumstances properly related to that object, would be in effect to make the
conditions
inoperative and to invest him with an uncontrolled legislative
39
power.

Professor Laurence Tribe refers to PanamaRefining as the type of case
which insists on "assurance of a policy's promulgation by a sufficiently
accountable body. "I The Council of North Carolina State Bar, not an
individual lawyer, is a sufficiently accountable body to make the difficult
policy decision of choosing between protection of client confidences and
the integrity of the judicial system when perjury has occurred.
With regard to client perjury, if the North Carolina State Bar Council
36. See TRIBE, The Supreme Court 1972 Term Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 13 n. 73 (1973-74) stating:
When the question is whether a certain kind of decision should be made legislatively or judicially, the Supreme Court regularly assumes that the final distribution of roles in accord with
the constitutional scheme must be its responsibility- even when the conclusion is that the role
should in the end be a legislative one. See, eg., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). And
within any given part of the public realm, the Court commonly proceeds on a quite explicity
role-allocating conception of the nature of its task. See, eg., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
790 (1973). But the Court has not limited its role-allocating mission to distributions of authority among or within public entities. On the contrary, it has also recognized its role-distributing
obligation when the question before it has been whether a particular type of decision must be
made privately, by persons and groups free of public regulation with respect to the relevant
aspects of their activities, or by publicly controlled, and hence at least partially accountable,
entities. For example, in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973), the Court described the question for decision as that of "who shall determine
what issues are to be discussed [over network television] by whom," Id. at 130, and did not
doubt its responsibility for resolving the question whether the type of decision there involved
had to be made by an uncontrolled group of private individuals or could instead be made by
some publicly regulated process.
37. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
38. Id. at 430.
39. Id. at 431-432.
40. L. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law 1141, ftn. 7 (1978).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1988

13

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1988], Art. 4

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
continues to delegate the choice of both goals and means to the whims of
individual lawyers, it may find that it has forfeited the power to make
decisions which traditionally have belonged to a state body. Not only
has the Supreme Court struck down delegations of power to insufficiently
accountable bodies, in cases such as Miranda4" and Roe v. Wade,4 2 the
Court has "legislated" precise guidelines for handling difficult situations.
In Nix,4 3 the Court stopped short of telling the Iowa Bar how the client
perjury problem must be handled, but there is no assurance that the
Court will be that restrained in the next case, particularly if it arises in a
jurisdiction such as North Carolina which has made a highly questionable delegation of decisionmaking power.
While waiting for further action from the North Carolina State Bar
and the courts, North Carolina criminal defense lawyers will do well to
follow the advice of Joseph B. Cheshire V and reveal the client's perjury
to the court.' As Cheshire states:
"It may cost you a client but it will gain you respect in the' eyes
45 of the
court and your peers and certainly protect your law license.

41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
44. CHESHIRE, General Ethical Considerationsin Criminal Cases and the PerjuriousClient in
Particular,20 TRIAL BRIEFS 34, 35 (1988).
45. Id.
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